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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)0"), 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. 
This appeal is taken from a final judgment and award of damages and costs made by the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. No other claims or 
parties remain before the trial Court for adjudication at this time, and no other related or prior 
appeals have been filed in connection with this action. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE: Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in denying Smith's Food & Drug 
Centers Inc. ("Smith's") Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New 
Trial or Remittitur by not ordering a new trial or, in the alternative, by not reducing the amount 
of damages awarded such that the damages conform with the evidence presented to the Jury at 
trial. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict ("JNOV") must 
be entered where either the facts or the law do not support the verdict. Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 59(a)(6). In reviewing a trial court's decision to deny a Motion for JNOV, a New 
Trial or Remittitur, the Appellate Court reviews the trial court's decision for abuse of discretion 
and should reverse if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the 
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Seale v. Gowans. 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59(a)(5) & (6): New Trials & Amendments of 
Judgment: 
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Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or any 
of the parties on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes: 
5. excessive . . . damages, appearing to have been given under the influence 
of passion or prejudice. 
6. insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that 
it is against law. 
Ut.R.Civ.P. 59(a)(5) & (6). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below 
Plaintiff/Appellee David Harness ("Plaintiff) brought an action in tort against Smith's 
Food & Drug Centers Inc. ("Smith's) for damages allegedly arising from an accident in the back 
room of the Smith's store located in Kearns, Utah. Plaintiff was employed by Nabisco Inc. as a 
vendor. Plaintiff sold Nabisco products to various stores on his route in the Salt Lake valley 
which were assigned to him by Nabisco. 
Plaintiff was responsible for monitoring stock in the stores and assuring that each store 
had sufficient product on hand such that the display shelves were never empty. In anticipation of 
the Labor Day weekend of 1989, Plaintiff submitted a large order on behalf of Smith's. Pursuant 
thereto, Plaintiff stocked the shelves until they were full and then took the extra product to the 
back room and was in the process of placing the product on a storage shelf when he slipped and 
fell thereby injuring his heel. 
Smith's backroom was equipped with storage shelves that had three (3) levels, to wit: 
ground level, six feet high and twelve feet high. Smith's assigned the lower shelves to vendors 
who had large, awkward and/or heavy product (e.g., soda pop vendors, beer vendors, canned 
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food, large dog food bags, etc.). The higher shelves were assigned to vendors whose product 
came in smaller packages and/or were lighter. Because Plaintiffs product, (e.g., cookies, 
crackers, and other snacks) came in small boxes and were light in terms of weight, he was 
allocated storage space on the top shelf, twelve feet from the ground. 
On the day of the accident, Plaintiff climbed to the top shelf by climbing on the side rails 
of the shelf and then stood on the top shelf. Plaintiff had an assistant working with him and the 
assistant would throw the packages up to Plaintiff, who would catch them and then place them on 
the shelf. In stepping to catch a package that had been tossed up to him, the Plaintiff mis-
stepped, fell from the top shelf and landed on his feet. As a result of the impact, Plaintiff 
suffered a broken heel on his left foot and a broken leg. Aside from the broken heel and leg, 
Plaintiff suffered no other injuries and, of the injuries suffered, Plaintiff only claimed to have 
problems with only his left heel. Plaintiff admitted that his legs had fully healed. Plaintiff 
admitted at trial that he was cleared for work within weeks of his accident, on the condition that 
he not be required to stand on his feet throughout the day. 
Plaintiff testified that several months after his accident, he considered a career in "real 
estate."1 Plaintiff also indicated that he contacted a few local schools with respect to continuing 
education classes. However, Plaintiff never followed up on either the alternative career 
possibilities or educational opportunities. Instead, Plaintiff unilaterally decided to not work and, 
pursuant thereto, stayed at home while his wife supported the family as a secretary. It is 
1
 In this respect, Plaintiffs former supervisor at Nabisco, James Black, was terminated 
due to a corporate re-oranization shortly after Plaintiffs accident. Pursuant thereto, Mr. Black 
testified that he moved into the real estate business within "60 days" and that it took "several 
months" to develop a reliable stream of income. (Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 226 & 231) 
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uncontested that, aside from the broken heel, Plaintiff suffered no other injuries in any other part 
of his body and, with the exception of standing on his feet all day, he was cleared to return to 
work by his doctor. 
The jury found in favor of Plaintiff on the issue of negligence and awarded him Six 
Hundred and Eighty Thousand Dollars ($680,000.00) in lost income/lost earning capacity, Two 
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000.00) in general damages and Twelve Thousand Dollars 
($12,000.00) in medical expenses. Plaintiffs award was then reduced by Fifteen percent (15%); 
the amount of fault apportioned to him by the jury. 
Smith's moved for a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or, in the alternative, a New 
Trial or a Remittitur of the damages. After hearing and oral argument, the trial court denied 
these motions. 
Smith's now appeals the trial court's denial of its post trial motions. 
b. Statement of Facts: 
1. In September of 1989, Plaintiff was employed by Nabisco as a product vendor. 
Nabisco assigned Plaintiff a sales route which included several grocery stores in the Salt Lake 
valley. Plaintiff was responsible for selling Nabisco's products (e.g., cookies, chips, crackers, 
etc.) to the stores on his route and, pursuant thereto, he would personally stock the shelves in the 
stores with Nabisco's products after they were delivered to the stores. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 137-40 ) 
2. On September 5, 1989, Plaintiff was working in the Smith's Food & Drug Center 
located in Kearns, Utah (the "Store"). Plaintiff had finished stocking the display shelves on the 
sales floor and had moved to the back room of the Store where the vendors stored surplus 
product until the product was needed on the sales floor. Smith's assigned the vendors shelf space 
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in the back room. The shelf space assigned to Nabisco was the top shelf of heavy duty industrial 
shelf located in the back room for this purpose. The top shelf on which Plaintiff stored his 
product was approximately 12 feet high. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 148, 193-95) 
3. In order to access Nabisco's shelf space, Plaintiff climbed up the side of the 
shelves, using the side braces of the shelves as a ladder. Plaintiff then stood on the top shelf 
while his assistant, Larry Beers, threw the product up to him. Plaintiff would catch the product 
and then stack it on the shelf. Plaintiff was standing on the top shelf when he reached for a 
package that Mr. Beers had thrown up to him. As Plaintiff reached for the package, he stepped 
of the shelf, lost his balance and fell down to the concrete floor. Plaintiff landed on his feet and, 
due to the impact of landing, suffered a broken heel in his left foot. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 158-59) 
4. During the course of trial, Plaintiff claimed to have sustained more than Six 
Hundred and Eighty Thousand Dollars ($680,000.00) in lost income as a result of the broken 
heel he suffered in the 1989 accident (the "Accident"). 
5. Plaintiffs treating physician, Dr. Douglas Schow, released Plaintiff for work 
within six months of the date of the accident, to wit: in or about April of 1990. By way of 
stipulation, the parties agreed that Plaintiffs reasonable and necessary medical bills were 
approximately Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00). 
6. With the exception of one six (6) month period of time in 1990, Plaintiff has made 
no effort to return work or otherwise find employment. Pursuant thereto, Plaintiff not only 
admitted during cross-examination that he had not seriously considered other career possibilities, 
but he acknowledged that with the exception of "calling a few community schools years ago" he 
had given no consideration to retraining himself or pursuing some form of vocational 
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rehabilitation in another area that would not have required he stand on his feet all day long. (Tr. 
Vol. 1, pp. 162-63) 
7. The undisputed evidence at trial was that the only injury Plaintiff suffered in the 
Accident was a broken heel. Aside from the injured heel, Plaintiff admitted that he had no other 
physical or mental limitations that would prevent him from seeking vocational rehabilitation, 
further education or otherwise seeking alternative employment that did not require he be on his 
feet as was required in his job with Nabisco. Specifically, Plaintiff sustained no brain or other 
kind of head injury, no neck or back injuries or any other kind of injury to any other part of his 
body. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 159) 
8. Plaintiffs treating physician, Dr. Douglas Schow, specifically admitted that 
"there's nothing in his head, shoulders, arms, back, that would prevent him from working." (Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 153). Dr. Schow also admitted that he had treated many patients who had suffered 
similar or worse injuries and subsequently made the transition from one area of employment to 
another. (Tr. Vol. p. 155). Dr. Schow admitted that he couldn't think of a "good reason why he 
couldn't" go back to work." (Tr. Vol. p. 155). Finally, Dr. Schow admitted that he had 
recommended a surgical procedure to the Plaintiff which would reduce the pain he felt in his 
foot. However, Plaintiff declined the surgery. (Tr. Vol. p. 145). 
9. Plaintiffs lost income claim of Six Hundred and Eighty Thousand Dollars 
($680,000.00) was based on the following assumptions: (1) that Plaintiff was totally disabled and 
completely unable to return to any kind of work (Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 90); (2) that Plaintiffs level of 
income at the time of the injury would have grown steadily from the date of the injury7 in 
September of 1989 until he retired sixteen (16) years later, (e.g., in the year 2005)(Tr. Vol. p. 
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96); and (3) that Plaintiff would have enjoyed full and continuous employment with Nabisco 
throughout the time period between the date of his accident and the date of his retirement. (Tr. 
Vol. Ill, p. 94). 
10. Contrary to the assumption underlying Plaintiffs lost income claim, the evidence 
at trial demonstrated that Plaintiffs future income was speculative at best. First, Plaintiffs 
supervisor at the time of the Accident, James Black, testified that Plaintiff was not being 
considered for any type of promotion or other career advancement - that he had "gone as far as he 
could;" and second, Mr. Black testified that neither he or any of the other people who worked at 
Nabisco in September of 1989 were still employed with Nabisco. Conversely, Mr. Black 
testified that he and the other people who worked with the Plaintiff left shortly after Nabisco 
reorganized the Utah sales operation. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 226) 
11. With respect to his departure from Nabisco, Mr. Black testified that he possessed 
the same basic job qualifications as the Plaintiff, (e.g., high school diploma and several years of 
work experience in the grocery industry), and that when he left Nabisco it took him "60 days" to 
find a new job and a "number of months" to generate a reliable stream of personal income. 
Conversely, Plaintiff has had nine (9) years to develop a new career and has entirely failed to 
pursue another career, preferring instead to stay home. (Tr. Vol. p. 230-31) 
12. Aside from making a few phone calls with respect to possible employment in 
"real estate" shortly after the Accident, Plaintiff was not able to identify any concrete steps he 
had taken to mitigate his damages or otherwise re-train himself for employment or pursue any 
kind of alternative educational or career possibility. Conversely, Plaintiff candidly admitted that 
he sits at home while his wife supports the family through her job as a secretary. (Tr. Vol. I. 162-
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63) 
13- Plaintiffs economist testified that during the five (5) to ten (10) year period of 
time preceding trial, Utah's economy had experienced unprecedented growth (e.g., the economy 
is "very strong") and that the employment rate in Salt Lake County and Utah County was the 
lowest it had been in more than twenty (20) years. Pursuant thereto, Plaintiffs economist 
testified that not only is it his understanding that there are many employers searching for reliable 
employees with Plaintiffs qualifications, but he admitted that it was his understanding that it 
was an "employees market" and that employees were able to pick and choose among many 
possible job opportunities. (Tr. Vol. III. 96-97; 104) 
14. At the time of the Accident, Plaintiff was employed by Nabisco Inc. Pursuant 
thereto, Nabisco was responsible for training Plaintiff in the manner in which he performed his 
job. Conversely, Plaintiff admitted that Smith's had no duty to train and/or supervise him in the 
performance of his professional responsibilities and that all of his training had been provided by 
Nabisco, Inc. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 174) 
15. With respect to the actual performance of his job and the shelves in question, 
Plaintiff testified that he only used Smith's ladder about "half the time"and that he would climb 
up by way of the shelf braces the rest of the time, (e.g., climb up the shelves by going to the end 
of the shelf unit and climbing up the side braces). Plaintiff also admitted that he was standing 
on top of the shelves at the time of the accident and, as a result, the ladder would have made no 
difference in causing or preventing his fall. (Tr. Vol., p. 183-84) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Smith's position in this case is as follows: the lost income and general damage are 
completely unsupported by evidence. Instead, these awards are a result of passion and/or 
prejudice: not evidence. 
With respect to Plaintiffs lost income/lost earning capacity claim, the damages of Six 
Hundred and Eighty Thousand Dollars ($680,000.00) are based on several assumptions, none of 
which are supported by evidence. For example, the amount awarded for income was predicated 
upon the assumption that Plaintiff was rendered 100% disabled in the accident and, as a result, 
concluded that his lost income/lost earning capacity was equal to the present value of Plaintiff s 
annual income at the time of the accident, through the date of his retirement. This amount is not 
supported by the evidence. First, the only permanent injury claimed by Plaintiff is a painful 
heel.2 No other part of his person was permanently injured.3 Plaintiff has the full use of his 
mental and physical faculties - including his heel - provided that he not stand on his foot all day 
long. Plaintiff was cleared to work. In fact, Plaintiff was formally released to return to work by 
his doctor several weeks after the accident. 
Plaintiff has no income because he choose to not work and/or improve his education by 
submitting to some form of vocational rehabilitation. While the injury was certainly painful, the 
2
 Although Plaintiff also suffered broken legs, he admitted that his legs were ftilly healed 
and presented no problems. 
3
 It is interesting to note that Plaintiff underwent hip replacement surgery in 1995, but 
this surgery was admittedly unconnected to the incident at Smith's. 
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bottom line is that he suffered a broken leg and heel.4 There are many jobs Plaintiff could have 
pursued that would not require standing. Plaintiff has a duty to mitigate his damages and, in this 
case, that would impose upon him the duty of finding employment that is consistent with his 
physical abilities which would include work in the vast majority of professions. 
Plaintiffs expert economist testified that Utah's economy was "very strong" and that it 
was an "employees market." 5 The evidence undisputedly shows that Plaintiff could have found 
alternative employment had he looked. Instead, he choose to sit at home. However, because his 
decision to stay at home is not proximately caused by his injuries in the Accident, any damage 
award based on the assumption that he was 100% disabled is grossly in excess of even the most 
extravagent amount supported by the evidence. 
The inconsistency of the jury's verdict is further illustrated by the general damage award. 
While Plaintiffs medical damages were only Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00), the jury 
gave Plaintiff Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000.00) for pain and suffering - eighteen 
(18) times the total cost of his medical treatment. 
Smith's contends that the amount of damages can only be attributed to passion and/or 
prejudice and, as a result, the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Smith's Motions for 
JNOV, a New Trial or Remittitur. 
4
 With respect to the "permanent nature" of Plaintiff s heel injury, the evidence on this 
point at trial was mixed at best. For example, Dr. Schow, Plaintiffs treating physican, testified 
that he offered further surgery to Plaintiff in the event his heel became to painful. However, 
Plaintiff declined the surgery. (Tr. Vol. p. 
5
 Tr. Vol. pp. 96-97 & 104. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. SMITH'S IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT ON PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR LOST EARNING CAPACITY 
Smith's is entitled to JNOV on Plaintiffs claim for lost income in this case because there 
is no competent evidence to support the jury's verdict on the issue of lost income and/or loss of 
earning capacity. Conversely, the evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that Plaintiffs lost 
income claim was nothing more than unsubstantiated speculation. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that trial courts, under Rule 59 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, has a duty to correct a verdict if there is no competent evidence to 
support the verdict or if the verdict was influenced by passion or prejudice. For example, in 
King v. Feredav. 739 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah 1987) the Court stated: 
A trial court should grant a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict if, 
after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-movant, it finds 
that no competent evidence supports the verdict. 
id. At 620. See abo Scott v. Nabours. 296 N.E.2d 438 (Ind. App. 1973)(upholding directed 
verdict on claim for lost "earning capacity" where plaintiffs evidence was not such as to permit 
the jury to draw any reasonable inference on impairment of earning capacity). 
Lost income and/or earning capacity, for which the jury awarded Plaintiff nearly Six 
Hundred Eighty Thousand Dollars ($680,000.00) in this case is defined as the "permanent 
diminution in the ability to earn money." See 22 Am. Jur. 2d. Damages § 157 (emphasis added). 
See also Scott v. Nabours. 296 N.E.2d 438 (Ind. App. 1973)("The basic measure of damages for 
impairment of earning capacity is the difference between the amount which plaintiff was capable 
of earning before the injury and the amount which he was capable of earning thereafter.) 
(Emphasis added.) 
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To prove a loss of earning capacity, Plaintiff was required to prove his personal earning 
capacity before the injury, and that his personal capacity was diminished after the injury: 
Diminution or impairment of earning capacity is generally to be arrived at by 
comparing what the injured party was capable of earning at or before the time of 
the injury with what he was capable of earning after it occurred. 
See e.g. 22 Am. Jur. 2d. Damages § 167 and cases cited therein (emphasis added). See also 
Restatement (2nd) of Torts § 924, comment d: 
The extent of future harm to the earning capacity of the injured person is 
measured by the difference, viewed as of the time of trial, between the value of 
plaintiffs services as they will be in view of the harm and as they would have 
been had there been no harm. 
The fact of lost earning capacity "cannot be found from speculation and conjecture, but 
there must be a sound basis in evidence from which it can be reasonably determined that there is 
a greater probability [that the fact is as claimed by plaintiff] than otherwise." See Koer v. 
Mavfair Markets, 431 P.2d 566, 570 (Utah 1967). In Allen Distributing Co. v. Leatherwood. 648 
S.W.2d 773 (Texas App. 1983) the Court noted: 
Where a plaintiff seeks special damages for loss of earning capacity in a particular 
business or profession, the amount of his earnings or the value of his services 
must be shown with reasonable certainty. 
See 648 S.W.2d at 774. See also Restatement (2d) of Torts § 312 comment d ("As a condition to 
recover . . . for harm to earning capacity the person harmed must offer evidence, convincing to 
the trier of fact. . . That his earning capacity has been significantly harmed."). 
Viewed in light of the above, Plaintiffs evidence fails to prove either the fact of lost 
income and/or personal earning capacity, or any reasonably certain value of lost income and/or 
personal earning power. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim fails for three reasons: 
A. Plaintiff is Not Totally Disabled - He Suffered A Broken Heel: Plaintiff 
sustained a broken and, admittedly, painful heel. However, no other part of his person was 
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injured and certainly he was not 100% disabled or anything close to being totally disabled. 
Except for engaging in work that required Plaintiff to engage in labor that required him to be on 
his feet for extended periods of time, Plaintiffs doctors released him for work approximately six 
(6) weeks after the date of the Accident. 
B. Assumption of Continuous Employment Unsupported Speculation: A key 
assumption underlying Plaintiffs lost income claim is the notion that Plaintiff would have 
enjoyed an uninterrupted stream of income from continuous employment with Nabisco until his 
date of retirement in or about 2005. However, this assumption proved to be nothing more than 
unsubstantiated speculation. Plaintiffs former supervisor at Nabisco, James Black, testified that 
"organizational changes" at Nabisco resulted in the termination or departure of not only all of 
Plaintiffs former co-workers at Nabisco (e.g., the other vendors), but also the people who were 
his immediate supervisors, (e.g., James Black); and 
C. Plaintiff Made Decision Not to Work: Plaintiffs failure to secure new 
employment during the nine (9) year period of time between the date of his injury and the date of 
trial was a result of one factor: Plaintiff did not want to work. Aside from briefly considering a 
career in real estate, the Plaintiff did not investigate or otherwise pursue any other employment 
opportunities and the Plaintiff did not pursue or consider any kind of vocational rehabilitation 
classes or any other kind of educational opportunity available to him. Conversely, the Plaintiff 
elected to sit at home while his wife supported the family through her secretarial position, in 
spite of the fact that he was nowhere near 100% disabled and despite the fact that it was an 
"employees' market" because of the "strong economy" in Utah. Not only did the Plaintiff choose 
not to work, but he introduced no evidence at trial which could support the jury's conclusion that 
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Plaintiff was 100% disabled and totally unable to engage in or obtain any kind of employment. 
Although the Plaintiffs injury limited his ability to perform certain types of labor, the 
fact that he is capable of engaging in other types of work demands that his capability for work be 
factored into his lost income claim. For example, in Scott v. Nabours. 296 N.E.2d 438 (Ind. 
App. 1973), the plaintiff worked as a laborer for approximately $3.42 per hour. Plaintiff then 
suffered an injury consisting of "severe whiplash," "kyphosis," "nerve pressure," etc., all of 
which a doctor opined were permanent and interfered with the plaintiffs ability to do certain 
things (e.g., climbing and lifting) required by his job. At the time of trial, plaintiff was making 
approximately $3.88 per hour doing perhaps a slightly different job. On appeal from the trial 
court's directed verdict on the claim for lost "earning capacity," the court stated: 
[D]amages for impairment of earning capacity cannot be recovered in a personal 
injury action where there is no evidence of such impairment or no evidence from 
which damages there fore can be calculated. Although the evidence need not 
show conclusively or with absolute certainty that earning capacity has been 
impaired, mere conjecture or speculation does not warrant an award of damages 
therefor in personal injury actions . . . Accordingly, most courts hold that in order 
to warrant a recovery for impairment of earning capacity in personal injury 
actions, the impairment of earning capacity must be shown with reasonable 
certainty or reasonable probability, and there must be evidence which will permit 
the jury to arrive at a pecuniary value of the loss. 
* * * 
In this case the Appellant's evidence did not make the necessary final step to 
relate the Appellant's condition to an impaired vocational potential. The 
Appellant's evidence would not permit the jury to draw such inferences on that 
subject. Therefore, it was permissible for the trial court to withdraw that issue 
from the jury. 
See 296 N.E.2nd at 441 (citations omitted). 
In this case, Plaintiffs only evidence of lost income and/or lost earning capacity was the 
present value calculations provided by his economist based on his annual income before the 
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accident occurred and the assumption that, except for the incident at Smith's, he would have 
worked continuously during the fifteen (15) years between the date of the Accident and his 
projected retirement. Plaintiff made no effort to prove with reasonable certainty how this injury 
actually effected his actual or potential ability to retrain himself and/or seek alternative forms of 
employment. 
Under the circumstances, as a matter of law, Plaintiff failed to prove the necessary final 
step for his claim that his capability to earn money had been substantially diminished - let alone 
diminished in an amount of Six Hundred Eighty Thousand Dollars ($680,000.00), the purported 
present value of his annual income as projected over the fifteen (15) year period between the date 
of the Accident and his anticipated retirement date. Smith's is therefore entitled to JNOV on the 
award of lost income and/or personal earning capacity. 
II. SMITH'S IS ENTITLED TO JNOV ON PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR LOST 
EARNING CAPACITY 
Pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court should reverse the 
trial court's denial of Smith's Motion for a New Trial in the above-captioned matter because the 
damages awarded by the jury are excessive and because the trial court abused its discretion in not 
granting Smith's Motion for a New Trial. Rule 59 provides that a trial court may grant a new 
trial for the following reasons: 
a. Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all 
or any of the parties on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes: 
g-
(5) excessive . . . damages, appearing to have been given under the influence 
of passion or prejudice. 
(6) insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that 
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it is against law. 
Ut.R.Civ.P. 59(a)(5) & (6). 
The trial court's discretion to grant a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 because of evidentiary 
insufficiency or legal error is well established. "The trial judge has broad latitude in granting or 
denying a motion for a new trial, and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of 
discretion." See Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 731 (Utah 1982). "[A] trial judge may 
properly grant a new trial under Rule 59(a)(6) when he or she can reasonably conclude that the 
verdict is clearly against the weight of the evidence or that there is insufficient evidence to justify 
the verdict. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 799 n.9 (Utah 1991)(citations 
omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
If is clearly appears that there has been a miscarriage of justice because the jury 
has refused to accept credible, uncontradicted evidence where there is no rational 
basis for rejecting it, or it is plain to be seen that the jury has acted under a 
misconception of law, or where it appears that the verdict was the result of 
passion or prejudice it is both the prerogative and duty of the court to set aside the 
verdict and grant a new trial. 
See Efco Distributing Inc. v. Perrin, 412 P.2d 615, 617 (Utah 1966)(emphasis added); See also 
King v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 212 P.2d 692, 696 (Utah 1949)("duty to grant" new trial 
when verdict unsupported by evidence or against weight of evidence). 
In Bodon v. Suhrmann, 327 P.2d 826 (Utah 1958), the Court held that a trial court has 
inherent supervisory powers over jury verdicts, which derive from the trial court's duty to see 
that justice is done, and to make corrective orders for that purpose. 
In evaluating a motion for a new trial, a trial court has "considerable latitude of discretion 
in granting or denying of a motion for a new trial in accordance with his judgment as to what the 
-16-
ends of justice require." Lee v. Howes, 548 P.2d 619, 621 (Utah 1976). The trial court's ruling 
on a motion for a new trial will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is clear abuse of the trial 
court's discretion. Lembach v. Cox. 639 P.2d 197, 201 (Utah 1981). 
A. The General Damage Award in the Above Captioned Matter Was Excessive 
and the Product of Passion and/or Prejudice. 
Under Rule 59(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a new trial is warranted where 
damages are excessive and appear to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
Given the fact that the stipulated amount of Plaintiff s reasonable and necessary medical 
expenses was approximately Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00) and that Plaintiffs sole 
injury was a broken heel, the jury's verdict of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000.00) in 
general damages was so grossly excessive to the injury that it can be said, as a matter of law, the 
verdict must have been arrived at because of passion or prejudice. 
In Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co.. 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
[A] reviewing court will defer to a jury's damage award unless the award 
indicates . . . that the award is so excessive beyond rational justification as to 
indicate the effect of improper factors in the determination. 
Id. At 1084(citations omitted). 
In Mecham v. Foley. 235 P.2d 497 (Utah 1951), the Utah Supreme Court stated that if the 
amount of the jury's verdict is so grossly excessive and disproportionate to the injury that it can 
be said from such fact alone as a matter of law that the verdict must have been arrived at because 
of passion or prejudice, then the trial judge abused his discretion if he fails to conditionally grant 
a new trial. Id. at 499. In this case, the pain and suffering damage award was excessive beyond 
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rational justification and reflects the effect of passion and prejudice. As discussed above, the 
Plaintiff suffered a broken heel. Admittedly, Plaintiffs heel precluded him from pursuing work 
as a vendor, which would have required that he be on his feet throughout the work day. 
However, the evidence also demonstrated that Plaintiff was released by his doctor to return to 
work within weeks of the accident, provided he stay off of his left heel. 
Furthermore, the evidence revealed that Plaintiff recovered so nicely from his injury that 
he refused further surgery offered by his treating physician, Dr. Schow, who testified that the 
surgery would be provided if Plaintiff required further relief from pain in his heel. (Tr. Vol. 
The end result was a general damage award eighteen (18) times the amount of special 
damages, which standing alone evidences that it was given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice and demonstrates that Smith's did not receive a fair trial and, as a result, should be 
granted a new trial in the absence of remittitur of the damages to an amount within proper limits 
as viewed by the Court absent passion or prejudice. 
The compensatory award of general damages is clearly excessive given the evidence 
presented at trial. In First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedvards. 653 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982), 
the Utah Supreme Court, in cutting a general damage award in half, stated: 
While the finder of fact has wide latitude in determining damages, this Court has 
authority to reduce the amount that the trial courts award where all reasonable 
minds would conclude [that] the limits have been exceeded. 
Id. at 598 (citations omitted). 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Gumbs v. Pueblo International Inc., 823 F.2d 768 
(3rd Cir. 1987), noted the growing need for courts to review damages awards. In Gumbs, Celia 
Gumbs slipped and fell on salad oil in the defendant's store. She sprained her coccyx in the fall. 
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After her accident, she reported being unable to enjoy sexual relations with her husband, which 
allegedly caused their marital relationship to suffer. The marriage eventually ended. Gumbs 
sued the defendant and won a jury verdict of Nine Hundred Thousand Dollars ($900,000.00). 
The district court reduced the award to Five Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars 
($575,000.00). The Third Circuit Court held that the damage award, even after remittitur, was 
excessive. In ordering a further reduction, the Third Circuit Court stated: "[W]e do not believe 
that Five Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($575,000.00) is within even the outermost 
limits of the range of reasonable and acceptable verdicts for the injury that Plaintiff sustained . . . 
" Id. at 773. In ordering a further remittitur of damages, the court stated: 
This Court takes note of the increasing willingness of the appellate courts to 
review damage awards. There is no doubt that this trend is in response to the 
increasingly outrageous amounts demanded by plaintiffs and awarded by juries. 
A jury has very broad discretionary in measuring damages; nevertheless, a jury 
may not abandon analysis for sympathy for a suffering plaintiff and treat the 
injury as though it were a winning lottery ticket. There must be a rational 
relationship between the specific injury sustained and the amount awarded. 
Id-
The jury's award of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000.00) for pain and suffering 
damages in the instant case is grossly excessive. The jury in the instant case was obviously 
moved by passion and prejudice for the Plaintiff because there is no rational relationship between 
the specific injuries actually sustained by the Plaintiff and the amount awarded by the jury. The 
jury's verdict, in and of itself, is the best evidence of the fact that the jury acted from passion and 
prejudice. Accordingly, the Court should reverse the trial court's denial of Smith's Motion for a 
New Trial or, in the alternative, substantially reduce the compensatory damages awarded for pain 
and suffering. 
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B. The Damage Award for Lost Income Was Excessive and the Product of 
Passion and/or Prejudice. 
As discussed under Point I above, which arguments are incorporated herein by reference, 
there was no competent evidentiary basis for the jury's award of Six Hundred Eighty Thousand 
Dollars ($680,000.00) for Plaintiffs lost income and/or diminution of earning capacity. As a 
matter of law, Plaintiff failed to prove his case because, although he provided some evidence of 
his annual income before the injury, he did not show the value of his time after the injury. 
Plaintiff admitted that aside from making a few inquiries with prospective employers and 
contacting some local schools regarding vocational programs a few months after the Accident, he 
made no other attempt to go back to work or otherwise acquire new skills that would allow him 
to return to the work force. Plaintiff made this decision in spite of the fact that he had been 
cleared for work by his doctor, and in spite of the fact that he had at least fifteen (15) more years 
to work productively until he reached retirement. 
As indicated above, the undisputed fact is that Plaintiff injured his heel. Plaintiff did not 
claim to have suffered any kind of injury to any other area of his physical person and, as a result, 
his unilateral decision to not return to the work force under any circumstance was wholly 
unwarranted and a clear breach of his duty to mitigate his damages. Because the jury could not 
reasonably calculate any difference or diminution in Plaintiffs earnings, Smith's is entitled to 
have a new trial or, in the alternative, a drastic reduction in the amount awarded to Plaintiff for 
lost income and/or last earning capacity. 
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III. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE COURT SHOULD REMIT THE AMOUNT 
OF DAMAGES TO AN AMOUNT WITHIN THE LIMITS OF 
PLAINTIFF'S PROOF 
As noted above, the Court in Gumps v. Pueblo International Inc.. 823 F.2d 768 (3rd. Cir. 
1987), addressed the increasing need for courts to review damage awards: 
[T]his court takes not of the increasing willingness of the appellate court to review 
damage awards. There is no doubt that this trend is a response to the increasingly 
outrageous amounts demanded by plaintiffs and awarded by juries . . . There 
must be a rational relationship between the specific injuries sustained and the 
amount awarded. 
See 823 F.2d 773. 
In First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards. 650 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982), the 
Supreme Court, in cutting a general damage award in half, stated: 
While the finder of fact had wide latitude in determining damages, this Court has 
authority to reduce the amount that the trial courts award where all reasonable 
minds would conclude [that] the limits have been exceeded. 
Id. at 598 (citations omitted). 
Plaintiff in this case is a 57 year-old individual who had worked in the grocery industry 
for more than thirty (30) years. As a result, he had an extensive and well defined work history. 
By his own testimony, he was an "excellent employee." Furthermore, because of his experience 
in the grocery industry (e.g., store director, award winning retail vendor, etc.), he had well 
developed work habits and extensive experience managing himself and other people: basic traits 
that would be highly beneficial in any field or profession the Plaintiff may have ultimately 
pursued. 
The evidence demonstrated that Plaintiffs sole injury was a broken heel and that these 
injuries interfered with his ability to stay on his feet all day long. With the exception of 
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employment that required Plaintiff to work on his feet throughout the day, he was otherwise 
cleared to work. 
Nevertheless, the jury awarded nearly Six Hundred Eighty Thousand Dollars 
($680,000.00) for "lost income and/or lost earning capacity," which is an element of general 
damages (see e.g., 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 151 ("Loss of earning power is an element of 
general damages awarded for the loss of ability thereafter to earn money.")), as well as some 
Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000.00) in general damages, and approximately Twelve 
Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00) for medical expenses. Under the circumstances, there is no 
rational relationship between the specific injuries sustained and the more than Eight Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($800,000.00) awarded in total damages. Clearly, the jury considered 
improper factors such as sympathizing with Plaintiff in making the award and/or was prejudiced 
against an insured corporate defendant. 
In the interest of justice, Smith's respectfully submits that this Court should: (1) reduce 
the judgment down to the medical expenses that were stipulated to by the parties as reasonable 
and necessary; (2) reduce the general damage award to an amount that is rationally related to 
Plaintiffs injuries and other medical damages; and (3) strike the entire damage award of Six 
Hundred Eighty Thousand Dollars ($680,000.00) for lost income and/or lost earning capacity 
because these damages are speculative, at best, and wholly unsupported by any evidence. In the 
alternative, Smith's requests that the Court reverse the trial court's denial of Smith's Motion for 
a New Trial. 
-22-
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set-forth above, Smith's respectfully submits that this Court should: 
a. Reverse the trial court's denial of Smith's Motion for a New Trial and, pursuant 
thereto, order a new trial; or, in the alternative, 
b. Grant a Remittitur of the verdict to amounts that reasonably reflect the evidence 
introduced during trial. 
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